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Quantum digital signature (QDS) guarantee the unforgeability, nonrepudiation and transferability
of signature messages with information-theoretical security, and hence has attracted much attention
recently. However, most previous implementations of QDS showed relatively low signature rates
or/and short transmission distance. In this paper, we report a proof-of-principle phase-encoding
QDS demonstration using only one decoy state. Firstly, such method avoids the modulation of
vacuum state, thus reducing experimental complexity and random number consumption. Moreover,
incorporating with low-loss asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometers and real-time polarization
calibration technique, we have successfully achieved higher signature rate, e.g., 0.98 bit/s at 103
km, and to date a record-breaking transmission distance over 280-km installed fibers. Our work
represents a significant step towards real-world applications of QDS.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signature [1], as one basic primitive to ensure
internet information security, is widely used in software
distribution, financial transactions and electronic govern-
ment, where the signed messages are unforgeable, non-
repudiated and transferable. Generally, classical digi-
tal signature are largely designed exploiting public-key
cryptography, which relies on computational complexity,
e.g. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm [2] and elliptic-
curve-based protocols [3, 4]. However, such schemes are
potentially susceptible to the major breakthrough in al-
gorithms and especially rapid development of quantum
computers [5, 6]. Given the importance of digital signa-
ture, it is expected a more secure signature scheme to
counter the eavesdropper (Eve) equipping with unlim-
ited computational power. Quantum digital signature
(QDS), analogously to quantum key distribution (QKD)
[7], can offer information-theoretic security guaranteed
by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. The
first QDS was proposed by Gottesman and Chuang [8] in
2001. This scheme is enlightening, but currently unfea-
sible experimentally due to strict requirements of non-
destructive state comparison, long-time quantum mem-
ory and a secure quantum channel. Thereafter, several
experimentally friendly and high-throughput protocols
have been introduced [9–14] and experimentally verified
[15–22]. To name a few, Ref. [15] and Ref. [16] re-
ported the QDS demonstrations without the limitation
of nondestructive state comparison and quantum mem-
ory, respectively, but still with secure quantum channels.
Whereafter, Ref. [14] succeeded in reducing the techni-
cal complexity to the same level of QKD, thus removing
the assumption of secure quantum channels. Naturally,
decoy state method [23, 24] is adopted in QDS to resist
photon-number-splitting attacks [25, 26]. All these de-
velopments of QDS have paved the way to its practical
applications.
In this paper, we focus on further improving its prac-
tical performance, i.e. higher signature rates and longer
transmission distance with a simple experimental setup.
Firstly, we apply the one-decoy method, which outper-
forms the two-decoy scheme for almost experimental set-
tings in QKD [27]. More importantly, this method in
principle could decrease random number consumptions
and experimental complexity in state preparation. More-
over, low-loss asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interfermeters
(AMZIs) are employed, and, meanwhile, a real-time po-
larization calibration method is implemented to compen-
sate for polarization drifts. As a result, we get an easy to
operate and stable QDS system. With a rigorous statis-
tical fluctuation analysis [28, 29], we attain a signature
rate of 0.98 bit/s at 103 km, and reach the longest trans-
mission distance of 280-km optical fibers so far.
Here, we consider a three-part scenario, including one
signer, Alice, and two recipients, Bob and Charlie. Our
one-decoy QDS consists of a distribution stage and a
messaging stage. In distribution stage, Bob-Alice and
Charlie-Alice individually utilize the one-decoy QKD
protocol but without error correction and privacy ampli-
fication, namely key-generation protocol (KGP), to gen-
erate correlated bit strings. While in messaging stage,
Alice transmits signature messages to the two recipients.
The concrete procedure is outlined as follows:
Distribution stage. Bob (Charlie) prepares Nt weak
coherent state pulses, each of which is randomly mod-
ulated in ς ∈ {X,Z} basis and λ ∈ {µ, ν} (signal, de-
coy) state, and sends them to Alice. Alice randomly se-
lects ς ∈ {X,Z} basis to measure the received pulses.
Later, Bob (Charlie) and Alice publicly announce their
basis choices with an authentic channel and discard the
mismatched cases. They agree that the data in Z ba-
2sis is to extract sifted keys and in X basis to estimate
parameters. After previous sifting procedure, they ran-
domly reveal a small part of keys, say k-length, to es-
timate error rate EBA (ECA), leaving the rest as a key
pool for signature. To sign a message m = 0 or 1, Al-
ice and Bob (Charlie) choose L-length block from key
pool to construct signature sequence KBm and B
A
m (K
C
m
and CAm), where K
B
m and K
C
m is held by Alice, and B
A
m
(CAm) by Bob (Charlie). Finally, Bob (Charlie) ran-
domly selects half of his keys and forwards them as
well as corresponding positions to Charlie (Bob) with
a secret classical channel. Define Bob’s and Charlie’s
symmetrized keys as SBm = (B
A
m,keep, C
A
m,forward) and
SCm = (C
A
m,keep, B
A
m,forward), respectively.
Through the error rate of test keys EBA, the upper
bound of observed error rate EUBA can be estimated with
the Serfling inequality [30]
EUBA = EBA +
2
L
√
(L/2 + 1)(L/2 + k)
2k
ln (1/ǫPE), (1)
where ǫPE denotes the failure probability of Eq. 1. Simi-
larly, the upper bound of observed error rate EUCA can be
estimated, and EU = max(EUBA, E
U
CA). As in Ref. [14],
the minimum rate pE at which Eve can introduce errors
can be evaluated using
h (pE) = 2s
L
Z,1/L
[
1− h
(
φUZ,1
)]
, (2)
where h(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function; sLZ,1 and φ
U
Z,1 denote the lower
bound of single-photon counts and the upper bound of
single-photon error rate, respectively, which can be esti-
mated with one-decoy shceme [27] in finite-size scenario.
Messaging stage. Alice sends (m,Sigm) to a recip-
ient, say Bob, where Sigm = (K
B
m,K
C
m). Bob compares
his keys SBm with the received (m,Sigm) and records the
number of mismatches. If the mismatches in both halves
of SBm are fewer than sαL/2, where sα denotes the au-
thentication threshold associated with the desired secu-
rity of QDS protocol, Bob accepts the message and fur-
ther forwards to Charlie; otherwise, Bob rejects the mes-
sage and announces abortion of current protocol. Charlie
checks the forwarded message in the same way as Bob,
but using a different threshold sυ, with 0 < sα < sυ <
1/2, to protect against repudiation by Alice. Charlie ac-
cepts the message if the mismatches are still fewer than
sυL/2 in both halves of his keys.
Here, for simplicity, we set sα = E
U + pE−E
U
3 , and
sυ = E
U +
2(pE−EU)
3 . For security analysis of QDS pro-
tocol, we should consider the probability of robustness,
repudiation and forging, which are expressed as follws
[14]:
P (Robust) ≤ 2ǫPE , (3)
P (Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−
1
4
(sυ − sα)
2L
]
, (4)
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FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of the experimental setup. LD,
laser diode; IM, intensity modulator; BS, beam splitter; PM,
phase modulator; PBS, polarization BS; Att, attenuator;
MOS, mechanical optical switch; EPC, electronic polarization
controller; SNSPD, superconducting nanowire single-photon
detector. Low loss single-mode fibers are used in the link
between Bob (Charlie) and Alice.
P (Forge) ≤ α+ ǫF + 10ǫPE, (5)
where α and ǫF are associated with the probability of
Bob finding a signature with an error rate smaller than
sυ; the addition of 10ǫPE denotes the failure probabilities
of estimating channel parameters in finite-size scenario.
ǫF is defined as
ǫF =
1
α
[
2−L/2{2s
L
Z,1/L[1−h(φ
U
Z,1)]−h(sυ)} + ǫ
]
, (6)
where ǫ is the failure probability of estimating Eve’s in-
formation in accordance with smooth min-entropy. Fi-
nally, for the protocol to be secure, the system’s security
parameter Psec satisfies
Psec ≥ max {P (Roubst) , P (Repudiation) , P (Forge)} .
(7)
The optical layout of our experimental setup is
sketched in Fig. 1, where Bob and Charlie perform KGP
with Alice separately in distribution stage. At trans-
mitting Bob (Charlie) side, a laser diode (LD) pulsed
at 50 MHz emits weak coherent pulses with 1550.12-nm
center wavelength and 100-ps temporal duration. The
laser possesses an intrinsic global phase randomization,
which is a precondition to apply decoy-state technique.
The intensity modulator (IM) is employed to modulate
two different intensity levels, namely signal and decoy.
Such one-decoy method omits the modulation of vacuum
state, thus allowing single IM to provide a high dynamic
extinction ratio and decreasing the modulation error.
Moreover, it can reduce random number consumptions
for controlling the IM. Quantum information is encoded
upon optical phase using a homemade AMZI, with which
each pulse is split into two divergent time bins (6.3 ns
delay) of orthogonal polarizations. The AMZI consists
of a beam splitter (BS), a phase modulator (PM) and
a polarization BS (PBS), all of which are connected by
polarization-maintaining fibers. In this way, we can re-
duce 3-dB loss in a pair of AMZIs, and thereby increase
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FIG. 2. Monitoring the side-peak and interfering peak stabil-
ity under continuous operation of our QDS system for 6 hours
at 204 km.
the useful counts. We should point it out that, limited
by the modulation rate of PM, we adjust the phase at
a low frequency, rather than completely random modu-
lation. Then the coded pulses are weakened to single-
photon level by an attenuator (Att) before transmitting
to Alice through quantum channel.
At the measurement side, a mechanical optical switch
(MOS) is inserted as routing function. Then, an elec-
tronic polarization controller (EPC) is deployed to adjust
the polarization drifts introduced in installed fibers by
monitoring and further suppressing the side-peak counts,
with which our QDS system can keep running continu-
ously and stably without being interrupted. Fig. 2 shows
the continuous operation of our QDS system at 204 km
for 6 hours with an intensity of 0.32, where the blue
(black) dot represents interfering (side-) peak counts. Al-
ice decodes the phase information with another identical
AMZI and directs the quantum signals into two com-
mercial superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tors (SNSPDs: TCOPRS-CCR-SW-85, SCONTEL com-
pany). The SNSPDs provide detection efficiencies about
65% with dark count rates of 20 Hz when working at
2.3 K. The signals from detectors are collected with a
time-to-digital converter (not shown in Fig. 1), whose
time window is set as 2 ns. The whole loss of measure-
ment side is about 1.53 dB. Due to the effects of environ-
mental fluctuations and drifts on optical interferometers,
we adopt a scanning-and-transmitting mode [31, 32] to
compensate phase drifts every 20 minutes. The resulting
interference visibility is about 99.7% and the duty cycle
of transmission approximtes 86%. In fact, we can also
use an active phase compensation scheme [33] to further
improve the system efficiency.
With the setup, we experimentally investigate the per-
formance of one-decoy QDS at 103 km, 204 km and 280
km, respectively. For a better performance, all the inten-
sities and probabilities are optimized according to fol-
lowing parameters: the fiber loss is measured as 0.175
dB/km; the optical misalignment error rate is approxi-
mately 0.3%; and the total number of pulses sent by Bob
or Charlie is 2 × 1012 at each distance. In addition, we
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FIG. 3. The signature rates versus transmission distance.
The upper (lower) line denotes our theoretical signature rates
with the security parameter 10−5 (10−10); while the asterisks
denote corresponding experimental results at the transmission
distance of 103-, 204- and 280-km installed fibers, respectively.
In addition, other similar experimental reports are marked as
different points for comparison.
reasonably set ǫPE = 10
−5, α = 10−5 and ǫ = 10−10.
The theoretical and experimental results are shown in
Fig. 3, and the data of Refs. [17–22] are also marked for
comparison. The red dash line denotes the theoretical
signature rates with the security parameter Psec = 10
−5;
while the red asterisks corresponds to experimental sig-
nature rates at different distances. It can be seen that
our experimental results agree well with theoretical pre-
dictions. The specific experimental values and estimated
parameters are exhibited in Table I and Table II, respec-
tively. For a fair comparison, we simulate another the-
oretical (blue dash) line with respect to Psec = 10
−10,
which is a little worse than the red one.
As shown in Fig. 3, the experimental results of Refs.
[17, 22] are better than our theoretical signature rates
at short distance, e.g., ¡ 100 km, which is attributed
mainly to their high repetition rate. The security of
differential-phase-shift protocol used in Refs. [17, 18]
against coherent attack has not been completely proven.
Moreover, compared with other reports, we achieve bet-
ter performance both in signature rates and transmission
distance with a simple experimental system. The details
of typical experimental parameters and corresponding
time to sign a bit message are listed in Table III. Among
them, the KGP in Ref. [20] exploits measurement-device-
independent QKD protocol, and therefore possesses the
highest security level. Ref. [19] implements over a dis-
tance of 102 km based on SARG04 protocol. In their
experimental system, the transmitter employs different
laser diodes to prepare specific states. This practice
might induce a side channel when pulse shape and pulse
width vary for different laser diodes [34]. As for Ref. [21],
4TABLE I. List of Total Counts (nςλ) and Error Counts (m
ς
λ) at Different Distances. Numbers in Brackets Indicate Powers of
10.
Event
Bob-Alice Charlie-Alice
103 km 204 km 280 km 103 km 204 km 280 km
nZµ 4.17[9] 5.53[7] 2.04[6] 4.03[9] 5.21[7] 2.05[6]
mZµ 7.35[6] 165422 39090 6.66[6] 171233 36028
nZν 4.05[7] 4.22[6] 407033 4.09[7] 4.00[6] 396024
mZν 77579 26223 21908 109820 25500 21838
nXµ 1.84[6] 253975 102804 1.85[6] 254259 100303
mXµ 1956 686 1831 2657 675 1854
nXν 19474 18389 20279 19240 19636 21236
mXν 68 104 1209 34 94 1086
TABLE II. Overview of Estimated Parameters with Security
Parameter of 10−5.
Distance sLZ,1 φ
U
Z,1 sα sυ Siganture Rate
103 km 17250 2.18% 8.02% 10.81% 0.98 bit/s
204 km 21877 2.53% 7.19% 9.59% 0.01 bit/s
280 km 139259 3.90% 4.67% 5.44% 4.67× 10−5 bit/s
it achieves the longest transmission distance to date, but
a low signature rates. Besides, it adopts the intricate
parametric down-conversion source, and a local detection
that requires high performance of detectors.
To conclude, we have implemented a practical QDS
experiment using low loss AMZIs. It feature an efficient
one-decoy scheme and real-time polarization calibration.
Benefiting from above advantages, our QDS system is
simple and stable. Compared with previous reports, un-
der the security premise of unforgeability, nonrepudia-
tion and transferability of QDS protocol, we successfully
achieve higher signature rates and to date the longest
transmission distance, which paves the way towards prac-
tical implementation of QDS in the near future.
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